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COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY-THE "STRONG-ARM CLAUSE" OF SECTION 70(c)-
EFFECT UPON BELATED FILING OF A CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
It is apparent that the courts have influenced debtor-creditor relation-
ships by judicial interpretation and construction of the federal bankruptcy
laws. Foremost in the controversy has been the "strong-arm clause" of
section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act1 which fortifies the trustee with the
powers of "the ideal creditor, irreproachable and without notice, armed
cap-a-pie with every right and power which is conferred by the law of
the state upon the most favored creditor who has acquired a lien by legal
or equitable proceedings. ' 2 This clause must be read concurrently with
section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, which places the trustee in the
shoes of an actual existing creditor with the powers bestowed upon
such a creditor by federal or state law and which permits the trustee to
void any transfer that the creditor having a claim provable under the
act could avoid.8 The question has arisen whether the trustee, as an
ideal hypothetical creditor under section 70(c) has a lien superior to that
of a mortgagee who has not filed his chattel mortgage under state law
within a reasonable or fixed time after its execution but who did file it
more than four months before bankruptcy, even though there was no
creditor in existence who under state law had extended credit to the
bankrupt between the date of execution of the chattel mortgage and the
date of its filing and thus could have contested the validity of the chattel
mortgagee's lien. Before this question is discussed, it would be wise to
review the history of the trustee's powers under section 70(c) and notice
the evolution and expansion of powers thereunder. This Comment will
then investigate the theory of recent cases defining and interpreting the
trustee's powers under section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act and critically
evaluate their result.
1. 64 Stat. 23 (1950), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952). It provides,
"The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into possession or control
of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien by
legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as
of such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding a lien
thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exists."
2. In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss. 1932) (Holmes, J.).
3. 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1952), which pro-
vides: "A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a debtor adjudged
a bankrupt under this title which, under any Federal or State law applicable thereto,
is fraudulent as against or voidable for any other reason by any creditor of the
debtor, having a claim provable under this title, shall be null and void as against the
trustee of such debtor."
(437)
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I.
HISTORY OF THE "STRONG-ARM CLAUSE."
The Supreme Court in 1906, in the case of York Manufacturing Co. v.
Cassell,4 refused to give the trustee in bankruptcy a lien on property at
the time of bankruptcy where a conditional sale agreement had been exe-
cuted but not recorded as required under the applicable Ohio law so as
to make the contract enforceable against lien creditors of the purchaser
who levied prior to recording. There were no lien creditors in existence
who could avoid the sale under state law, and therefore it was held that
under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act the trustee was vested with no
better right or title to the bankrupt's property than belonged to the bank-
rupt at the time when the petition was filed. 5 Since the conditional sales
contract was good as between the conditional vendor and the bankrupt,
it was good against the trustee also as he took the bankrupt's title subject
to the same conditions and equities under which the bankrupt had
previously held it.
Congress' answer to the York case was the enactment in 1910 of
an amendment to section 4 7(a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act.6 The purposes
of this amendment were to give the trustee in bankruptcy the same title
as an execution or lien creditor would have under state law as to property
in the bankruptcy court's custody and further, to enable the trustee to
stand in the position of a judgment creditor having an unsatisfied execution
on property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court. Thus, it attempted
to wipe away the advantage previously given to holders of unrecorded,
secret liens.7
In a case interpreting section 4 7(a) (2), Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine
Co.,8 a fact situation was presented to the Court similar, though not iden-
4. 201 U.S. 344 (1906).
5. The Court did not refer to any particular provision of the act, and apparently
was referring to the general rule as to defenses available against the trustee. See
Commercial Credit Co. v. Davidson, 112 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1940), which states
the general rule that a trustee is not an innocent purchaser but takes the prop-
erty subject to all valid liens, claims and equities existing against it in the bank-
rupt's hands at the time of the filing of the petition.
6. 36 Stat. 840 (1910), which provided, ". . . and such trustees, as to all
property in custody or coming into the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be
deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien
by equitable or legal proceedings thereon; and also, as to all property not in the
custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be vested with all the rights, remedies,
and powers of a judgment creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied."
7. 45 CONG. Rtc. 2277, H.R., 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1910). Previously,
however, the Supreme Court had indicated that the York decision was more restricted
than Congress in enacting this provision presumed to be the case. See Security
Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206 U.S. 415 (1907) where the Court pointed out
that although there were no lien creditors in existence, where state law affords
protection to general creditors, and not merely lien creditors, then the trustee may
act in behalf of the general creditors as to voidable transfers.
8. 239 U.S. 268 (1915). Unlike the Constance case, state law in the Bailey case
protected only lien creditors.
438 [VOL. 5
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tical, to the recent case of Constance v. Harvey9 and the trustee also made
similar arguments. A vendor had sold an ice machine under a conditional
sale agreement which was not recorded until three months after its execu-
tion. Within two months of the recording, bankruptcy ensued and the ven-
dor attempted to recover the machine. Under state law, the conditional sale
agreement was valid between the parties but void as to a lien creditor
of the vendee who became such before the recording of the contract. It
was trustee's contention that, even though there was not in fact a lien
creditor in existence between the execution of the agreement and its re-
cording, section 47(a) (2) extended the status of lien creditor to the
trustee for the period when a lien creditor could have attacked the
unrecorded conditional sale agreement under the state law had there
been such a creditor. Significantly, the Court repudiated this argument
and agreed that the trustee had the status of a lien creditor but only
at the date of the bankruptcy and that the trustee could not relate such
a status back to any period prior to bankruptcy. Similarly, the Supreme
Court in Martin v. Commercial Nat. Bank10 held that a chattel mortgage,
which had been recorded six months after its execution and the day
before bankruptcy, was not voidable by the trustee either under the powers
bestowed upon him by section 70(c) or as a preference under 60(a), (b),"
as Georgia law required registration only in favor of a creditor who fixed
a lien on the property before the recording took place, and the trustee
acquired his lien after the recording. Under the Bailey and Martin cases
then, the trustee under section 70(c) is given the status of a hypothetical
lien creditor only at the date of bankruptcy with the trustee's rights and
powers being determined under the applicable state law.
The "strong-arm clause" has been subsequently amended and in
1938, section 47(a) (2) was incorporated in section 70(c) of the Chandler
Act.1 2 In Congress' own words, the purpose of the Chandler Amendment
was not to change the substance of the statute but to clarify its purpose and
provisions.' 3 In 1950, and again in 1952, the "strong-arm clause" of sec-
9. 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955). For a discussion
of the Constance case see text beginning at note 29, infra.
10. 245 U.S. 513 (1918).
11. 36 Stat. 842 (1910), 11 U.S.C. 96(a), (b) (1952). Under this section a
hypothetical creditor test as to personalty is carried back four months. Formerly,
under the Chandler Act the test was that of a bona fide purchaser. If the secured
interest is perfected within the four month period preceding bankruptcy, and
the debtor at that time is insolvent and the secured party had reasonable cause
to believe this to be so, then the trustee may void the preference as to the secured
party.
12. 52 Stat. 881 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952), which pro-
vided, ". . . the trustee, as to all property in the possession or under the control of
the bankrupt at the date of bankruptcy or otherwise coming into possession of the
bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested as of the date of bankruptcy with all the
rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by legal or
equitable proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exists; and, as to
all other property, the trustee shall be deemed vested as of the date of bankruptcy
with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor then holding an
execution duly returned unsatisfied, whether or not such a creditor actually exists."
13. H.R., 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1356 (1936).
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tion 70(c) was amended to read as it now stands.'U The strong-arm
clause now bestows the rights of a lien creditor upon the trustee as to all
property in which the bankrupt has an interest. The cumbersome language
distinguishing property in the bankrupt's possession at the time of bank-
ruptcy, that coming into the court's possession and all other property,
was eliminated in favor of a more simplified construction.' 5
II.
SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS.
Application of State Law Under Bankruptcy Act.
In order to determine the trustee's rights and powers under section
70(c), state law must first be ascertained and appropriately, the court may
have to determine if there has been a security transaction and if so what
type it is.10 Thus, whether a security transfer has been perfected 7 or,
if it has been perfected, whether a lien creditor at the date of bankruptcy
has priority over the trustee,' 8 may depend on state law and/or an inter-
pretation of the security agreement. State law may determine that an
unrecorded security transfer is voidable as to simple contract creditors 19
or, on the other hand, only as to creditors who have obtained a lien as of
the date of bankruptcy. 20 The effect of a belated recording is likewise
dependent upon the applicable state law.21
Under New York law, an unrecorded chattel mortgage is valid be-
tween the parties themselves but in the words of the statute, ". . . is
absolutely void as against creditors of the mortgagor, and as against subse-
14. 64 Stat. 23 (1950), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952).
15. See note 12, supra.
16. See, e.g., Caldwell Finance Co. v. McAllister, 226 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1955);
Finance & Guaranty Co. of Baltimore v. Still, 21 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1927), cert.
denied, 276 U.S. 619 (1928).
17. See, e.g., In the Matter of Luckenbill, 156 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
18. Sce, e.g., Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 913 (1955); In Re Consorto Constr. Co., 212 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 833 (1954).
19. See, e.g., Matter of American Cork Industries, Inc., 54 F. 2d 740 (2d Cir.
1931).
20. See, e.g., City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver, 230 F.2d 653 (N.D. Ohio
1955).
21. a) The belated recording may validate the transaction against all creditors
not having antecedent liens. In Re Consorto Constr. Co., 212 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 833 (1954).
b) The belated recording may validate the transaction except as to those
who extended credit relying on the non-filing of a security agreement. In Re
Di Pierro, 159 F. Supp. 497 (D. Me. 1958).
c) The belated recording may validate the transaction except as to those
extending credit between the execution and the recording of the agreement.
Matter of Faber, 41 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1930).
d) The belated recording may validate the transaction only as to creditors
becoming such after the recording. Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 99, 32 N.E.
1073 (App. Div. 1893).
e) The belated recording may fail to validate the transaction as to any
creditor. In Re Pacific Electric & Auto Co., 224 Fed. 220 (W.D. Wash. 1915).
(VOL. 5
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quent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith and for a fair consideration,
unless the mortgage or a true copy thereof, is filed as directed in this
article. '22 This has been construed by the Court of Appeals of New
York 23 to void the mortgage as to general creditors in existence at the time
of the execution of the mortgage when the mortgage is filed after an un-
reasonable delay. However, a chattel mortgage filed after an unreasonable
delay is valid as to subsequent creditors of the mortgagor but is voidable
as to all creditors who become such between the date of execution and the
filing of the mortgage.24
Constance v. Harvey Rationale.
In a 1952 bankruptcy case, Zamore v. Goldblatt,25 concerning a be-
latedly filed chattel mortgage, the mortgagee had attempted to replevy
certain articles in the bankrupt's possession at the time of bankruptcy.
There was one general creditor in existence at bankruptcy who had
extended credit to the bankrupt between the date of the excution of the
chattel mortgage and the date of the belated filing. The trustee was per-
mitted to sell the articles free and clear of the chattel mortgage which
was held void as to the trustee because of the belated filing. The court
said:
"It is argued by the appellants that the trustee could not attack the
mortgage because he represented only one small creditor whose claim
arose before the date of filing but one creditor who could attack it was
enough to avoid the mortgage under section 70, sub. c of the Bank-
ruptcy Act ...against later creditors represented by the trustee. '2 6
It appears that the trustee could have voided the mortgage transaction by
reason of the powers granted to him under section 70(e) where he is
subrogated to the rights of an existing creditor who could under state law
attack the transaction. The court relied upon the case of Moore v. Bay2 7
where the Supreme Court held a recorded mortgage invalid as to all
creditors since the recording was not in accordance with state law require-
ments. In the Moore case there were creditors who had extended credit
between the dates of the execution and the attempted recording of the
mortgage and also creditors who gave the bankrupt credit at a later
date. The mortgage was voided as to all under section 70 without specify-
ing the applicable subparagraph. Although the most significant feature
of this case was the fact that the Court held that once the security interest
is voided as to one creditor the trustee takes for the benefit of all creditors,
22. N. Y. UNcoNsoL. LAWS § 230 (McKinney 1959).
23. Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (App. Div. 1893).
24. Petition of Plans, 282 App. Div. 552, 125 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1953); Skilton v.
Codington, 185 N.Y. 80, 77 N.E. 790 (App. Div. 1906).
25. 194 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1952).
26. Id. at 934.
27. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
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the mortgage could have been voided under either section 70(c) or 70(e).
However, the court in Zamore cited section 70(c) which places the trustee
in the position of an ideal hypothetical creditor whose lien arises at the
date of bankruptcy. But two later decisions of the circuit,28 in citing the
Zamore case, indicated that the court there had relied on section 70(e).
It appeared then that the court in the Zamore case had erroneously cited
section 70(c) while intending to cite and use the theory of section 70(e).
However, in 1954, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of
Constance v. Harvey29 indicated that the court had in fact intended to rest
the Zamore case squarely on section 70(c) rather than on the trustee's
derivative rights under section 70(e). In the Constance case, a chattel
mortgage on a diner was executed but not filed until ten months later. An
attempted filing had been made by the attorney of the mortgagee
immediately after the execution of the mortgage but the clerk of the
county where the mortgage was to be recorded returned it unfiled. Failure
to record the mortgage was attributable not only to the public official
but also to the mortgagee's attorney. The bankruptcy of the mortgagor oc-
curred one year after the mortgage had been recorded. The trustee, pur-
suant to bankruptcy proceedings, sold the mortgaged property in which
the mortgagee now claimed a lien on the proceeds to the extent of the
purchase price. On appeal from the district court, which had held for
the trustee, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in its original disposition
of the case, said that under section 70(c) the trustee was given a legal
or equitable lien at the date of bankruptcy, i.e., the date when the petition
was filed. The court had noted that it did not appear whether any
creditors of the bankrupt had become such in the interval between the
execution and the recording of the mortgage. Under state law, it was said,
the chattel mortgage became effective when filed as to creditors extending
credit subsequent to the belated recording. Thus, the court correctly held
that the trustee was not vested with the status of a lien creditor under
section 70(c) with respect to this property unless the bankruptcy petition
was filed prior to the recording of the mortgage. The district court
was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to grant the validity
of the lien if it were further found that the bankruptcy petition was filed
after the chattel mortgage was recorded and that no creditor had a prove-
able claim between the execution and recording of the chattel mortgage.
However, although the trustee's petition for a rehearing was denied,
the court, sua sponte, "corrected" its opinion in view of New York law
rendering unrecorded chattel mortgages void "as to simple contract creditors
becoming such, without notice, prior to actual recording . . .,,10 as con-
trasted to New York law on conditional sales contracts which renders
such contracts "void as to creditors, without notice, who have acquired
28. American Trust Co. v. New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, 207
F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1953) ; In re Cerda, 119 F. Supp. 741 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
29. 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
30. Id. at 575. For text of statute see note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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liens on the goods prior to recording of the contract."3 1 The court reasoned
that in this chattel mortgage situation an existing contract creditor without
notice could have obtained a lien at the time of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy, and since under section 70(c) the trustee was an "ideal"
hypothetical creditor, then the trustee could prevail over the mortgagee.
The rationale of the Second Circuit may be deduced from section
70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act without violating the literal wording of the
statute. Section 70(c) merely defines the time when the trustee's lien
attaches, viz., at the date of bankruptcy. However, it leaves no guide to
ascertain when the trustee, as the ideal hypothetical creditor, has extended
the credit whereby his lien arises. Under the Zamore and Constance de-
cisions, the trustee may relate back his hypothetical extension of credit
to any suitable time when he can defeat both secured and unsecured
property transfers. Such a construction of the Bankruptcy Act was
questioned in a subsequent district court opinion.3 2 However, a 1956
Second Circuit decision, Conti v. Volper, 3 followed the Constance case and
stated that although these cases appear to reach inequitable results, the
language of section 70(c) demanded that result. It would seem though,
that under both state and federal law such a result is undesirable. One must
note, moreover, that the Supreme Court in neither the Bailey nor Martin
cases3 4 construed the ideal creditor provisions of section 70(c) to allow
the trustee to relate back his hypothetical extension of credit to any time
prior to bankruptcy, i.e., the date when his lien arose. Of course, application
of state law is given as the reason for the conflict.
It must be recognized then that Constance v. Harvey is the law in
the Second Circuit. The trustee is thereby placed in a position superior
to that of any individual creditor or groups of creditors under state
31. Id. at 575. (Emphasis added). N. Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 65 (McKinney
1959). "Every provision in a conditional sale reserving property in the seller shall be
void as to any purchaser from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of such
provision, purchases the goods or acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon them,
before the contract or copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter provided, unless such
contract or copy is so filed within ten days after the making of the conditional
sale. This section shall not apply to conditional sales of goods for resale."
See also Application of American Optical Co., 38 N.Y.S.2d 663 (Surr. Ct. 1942)
to the effect that the court may order the property redelivered to the seller even
though there are creditors outstanding at the time of the death of the conditional
buyer and where there has been no recording or notice of the transaction but where
the buyer's creditors have acquired no liens on the property.
32. In the Matter of Gondola Associates, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 205, (E.D.N.Y. 1955)
the court said: "The result here reached seems incongruous: a state statute enacted
to protect creditors who are such at a given date is held to operate in favor of a
trustee in bankruptcy who really stands in empty shoes, for he occupies a space
which does not exist, since there is no creditor who might enforce the right which
he asserts ... ;" and also: "I find it difficult to reconcile the present decision with
the equitable purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, but agree with the referee that the
opinion in the Constance case seems to compel such a result .. "
33. 229 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1956). Also see In re Varrator, 159 F. Supp. 730(S.D.N.Y. 1957) where the referee followed Constance v. Harvey but was reversed
by the district court on the grounds that the mortgage was recorded within a reason-
able time.
34. See notes 8-10, supra, and accompanying text.
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law and thus may strike down the secured position bestowed on the
creditor mortgagee by state law itself.85 In short, a secured creditor under
state law is no longer secured and so it would seem state law is
seriously impaired as a result of these decisions. Except for bankruptcy,
no creditor could have invalidated the chattel mortgage and the property
now inures to the benefit of all creditors, no one of whom had been
injured by the belated filing.
It is also incomprehensible why the rights and powers of a general
contract creditor when bestowed on the trustee under state law should
vest greater powers in that trustee than the rights and powers of a lien
creditor under state law. The court in the Constance case reasoned that
it was irrelevant under section 70(c) whether the bankruptcy petition
was filed before or after the mortgage was recorded as the mortgage was
void as to a simple contract creditor existing before recording and the
trustee was such a creditor. However, if the case was concerned with a
belatedly filed conditional sale contract, then the court would have de-
termined whether the instrument had been filed before or after the bank-
ruptcy petition as under state law an unfiled conditional sale contract
is void only as to lien creditors who become such before recording. 6
Thus, as a lien creditor, the court would bestow upon the trustee only such
rights as of the date of bankruptcy. The trustee's rights and powers, as
an ideal hypothetical creditor should arise, if one is to be consistent, at the
date of bankruptcy.
It also seems apparent that the Second Circuit decisions thoroughly
confuse the various sections of the bankruptcy act. The current inter-
pretation of section 70(c) in effect makes section 70(e) superfluous
and incorporates the well defined relation back theory of section 60(a),
(b)3 T into section 70(c). It is evident that sections 70(c) and 70(e) may
overlap 8 since under section 70(e) the trustee has the powers to void
any transaction which any existing creditor of the bankrupt could under
state law or federal law while section 70(c) confers the powers of an
ideal hypothetical creditor under state law at the time of bankruptcy. It
is quite conceivable that an unrecorded security agreement might be
voidable both under sections 70(c) and 70(e). However, to grant the
trustee the power under section 70(c) to assume the position of any
conceivable creditor is to grant the trustee any power an actual creditor
may have at the bankruptcy under state law to void any particular trans-
action. Also, section 60(a),(b) was designed to reach any perfection of a
previous transfer within four months of the petition in bankruptcy.
However, the operation of section 60(a),(b) has been elaborately and
35. See, e.g., In Re Myers, 19 F.2d 600 (N.D.N.Y. 1926). A creditor whose
claim came into existence after the recording of the chattel mortgage could not
invalidate the mortgage no matter how late the filing occurred.
36. See note 31, supra.
37. See note 11, supra.
38. See, e.g., Matter of Farm & Home Co., 84 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1936).
8
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carefully circumscribed by the Bankruptcy Act. The Constance case on
the contrary does not spell out how the trustee may wield his section 70(c)
power. Therefore, the trustee may relate back his hpothetical extension
of credit to any reasonable date preceding bankruptcy in order to void
any belatedly recorded agreement and is not limited by the four month
limitation of section 60(a),(b).
III.
APPLICATION OF CONSTANCE V. HARVEY RATIONALE BY OTHER COURTS.
A Sixth Circuit decision, In re Cotter,39 reached a result similar to
that later reached by the Second Circuit in the Zamore case.40 A chattel
mortgage executed on June 26, 1952, and recorded July 2, 1952, was
declared void as to the trustee in bankruptcy when, in the interim an
unsecured creditor extended credit to the bankrupt. The court held the
chattel mortgage void as to the trustee on the basis of both sections 70(c)
and 70(e). The decision should have been limited to section 70(e)
alone. In a later decision,4 ' the court specifically cited and followed the
Constance case saying: "As stated in Constance v. Harvey . . . where a
creditor without notice of the petitioner's unrecorded assignment could
have obtained a lien at the time of bankruptcy, the trustee under section
70, sub. c is entitled to the rights and remedies of such an 'ideal' hypo-
thetical creditor." However, the case is not on its facts on point for in
this instance there was no recording at all of the deed in question.
In a recent decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 42 the
court applied section 70(c) in a manner similar to that of the Second
Circuit in the Constance case. The court considered the question of a
belatedly filed chattel mortgage where an intervening creditor had obtained
and enrolled a judgment against the bankrupt between the execution
and the recording of the mortgage. Therefore, although it was a proper
case for the application of section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, the court
in addition held that section 70(c) also operated in favor of the trustee,
citing both the Constance and Conti decisions. However, the court then foot-
noted its decision by stating that if the criticism of the Constance case is
correct, the decision can rest on section 70(e) alone. A district court had
previously cited the Constance decision in an instance involving unrecorded
counter letters,43 but here section 70(c) was clearly applicable.
In a 1954 case, 44 a referee in the Seventh Circuit determined that a
chattel mortgage had been illegally executed under Illinois law and that the
39. 113 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
40. See note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
41. Matter of Plymouth Glass Co., 171 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
42. Brookhaven Bank & Trust Co. v. Gwin, 253 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1958).
43. Mayo v. Petty, 153 F. Supp. 501 (W.D. La. 1957).
44. In Re Kranz Candy Co., 214 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1954).
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trustee under section 70(c) could void the agreement. The mortgagee
had claimed that as there were no creditors at the time of bankruptcy
who had extended credit before the mortgage had been executed, then
the trustee could not assume a position superior to any creditors whom
he represented. The court of appeals affirmed the referee's decision
holding the trustee could avoid the transaction though there were no
creditors with claims extending back to the date of the mortgage. The
trustee under section 70(c) was an ideal hypothetical creditor and not
in a derivative position as under section 70(e). The correctness of the
decision turns entirely on the law of Illinois.45 If the mortgage under
state law was void as to creditors with claims arising at the date of
bankruptcy but enforceable against the bankrupt, then the trustee as the
ideal, hypothetical creditor could assume the powers of a simple contract
creditor and rely on section 70(c). On the other hand, if the mortgage
under state law was void only as to creditors whose claims arose previous
to the execution of the mortgage, then the trustee should rely only
on section 70(e) and to cite section 70(c) would be to invoke the same
questionable rationale applied in the Constance decision.
In a recent decision in the Ninth Circuit, United States v. England,
46
the court of appeals held that the trustee in bankruptcy was not a "judgment
creditor" as used in section 3672 of the Internal Revenue Code 47 and so
the government's unrecorded tax lien was prior to the trustee's rights
under section 70(c). The court said that the trustee was not in the
position of a creditor "holding a judgment obtained by judicial proceed-
ings."'48 This was a case involving the priority of a federal tax lien as
opposed to the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy under section 70(c),
and admittedly the cases do not treat the federal government as they do
other creditors. However, it would appear that the court in the light
of Congress' intent in passing the Bankruptcy Act and according to the
history and wording of the act, was clearly in error. 49 The status of a
judgment creditor is not bestowed upon the trustee in the literal reading
of the statute, but it would appear that the trustee as an ideal hypothetical
creditor must also be a judgment creditor. Thus, this court refused to
grant the powers customarily bestowed upon the trustee. The ground of
distinction is even more imperceptible if one considers further England
v. Sanderson.5" In this instance the court argued that the trustee assumed
45. ILL. Rev. STAT., ch. 32, § 1576 (1953). The court here found there was an
illegal transaction under the statute when an insolvent corporation purchased shares
of its own stock and executed and delivered notes and chattel mortgages to secure
payment. The transaction had not been entered into in good faith.
46. 226 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955). See also In Re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp.,
168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948).
47. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3672 (now INT. Rev. CODE of 1954, § 6323).
48. The court relied on United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361
(1953) and United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
These cases do not substantiate the decision of the Ninth Circuit as neither of
the above cases involved the rights of the trustee under federal law.
49. United States v. England, supra note 46 at 207.
50. 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956).
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the powers of a pre-existing creditor who could have obtained a lien at
bankruptcy to avoid the exemption filing under state law. Some creditors
had extended credit prior to the filing of the exemption by the bankrupt when
the exemption was for $7,500. When the bankrupt did file his exemption
two months prior to bankruptcy, the exemption allowed under California
law was $12,500. The court used section 70(c) and the Constance case
to reduce the exemption allowed to $7,500. Why the trustee should be
given the power to relate back his hypothetical extension of credit to some
time prior to bankruptcy but be denied the status of a judgment creditor
by the same court, cannot be deduced from a literal reading of the
Bankruptcy Act or as a logical outgrowth of the history of the act.
A district court in the Eighth Circuit has refused to follow Constance v.
Harvey.51 That case concerned a belatedly filed chattel mortgage where
no creditor had a claim arising between the date of execution and recording
of the mortgage. It was held that section 70(c) did not bestow any rights
or powers on the trustee under state law to avoid the mortgage. Similarly,
the First Circuit has declared that the Constance and Conti decisions have
placed "a cloud on the distinction between the rights, remedies and powers
of the trustees under section 70, sub. c and the derivative rights enjoyed
by the trustee under section 70, sub. e of the Bankruptcy Act."'52
On similar facts, the Third Circuit has refused to apply section 70(c)
as it was applied in the Constance case. In the case of In Re Consorto
Constr. Co.,53 there was a belatedly filed chattel mortgage. The Third
Circuit held that the late filing under the Pennsylvania Chattel Mortgage
Act 54 perfected the lien of the mortgagee as of the date of recordation.
Later creditors, and thus the trustee also, were subordinated to the interest
of the mortgagee lienor. The trustee's position under section 70(c) was
deemed to be that of a subsequent lienor. The court added that even under
section 70(e) the trustee, acting in behalf of existing creditors who had
obtained liens between the execution and recording of the chattel mortgage,
could not invalidate the mortgage, as state law provided only for subordina-
tion, not invalidation. The Consorto case, while applying a different inter-
pretation of section 70(c), is not necessarily contrary to the Constance de-
cision as the case may be distinguished on the basis of state law. However,
it would appear that the Consorto application of section 70(c) protects
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code from the Second Circuit theory
of relating back the trustee's hypothetical extension of credit to a time prior
to bankruptcy.
51. In the Matter of Herman Billings, 170 F. Supp. 253, 258 (W.D. Mo. 1959).
The court stated: "I think the construction placed on the statute in the Constance
case was clearly erroneous, and that it was never intended to give the trustee in
bankruptcy any such authority as that case holds."
52. In re Pierro, 159 F. Supp. 497, 498 (S.D. Me. 1958).
53. 212 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954).
54. Pa. Laws 1945, act 1358 (repealed).
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A Third Circuit district court, in the matter of American Textile
Printers Co., 55 distinguished the Constance and Conti cases as a result
reached on the basis of New York law through an interpretation of its
chattel mortgage act. In the present case, there was a belated recording
of a conditional sale before bankruptcy, but the trustee, as an ideal
hypothetical creditor, could not void the transaction. The court claimed
that the New Jersey conditional sale statute 56 occasioned a different result.
However, the court footnoted its decision by stating that, in any case, it
considered the Constance decision as an erroneous application of section
70(c).
It would appear that these later cases reach a more equitable result
both in regard to enforcing state law and at the same time not rendering
the state's provisions as to security agreements a nullity because of a
strained reading of section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted then, that the decisions of the Second Circuit con-
struing section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act are erroneous. To interpret the
trustee's position as an ideal hypothetical creditor who can relate back
his hypothetical extension of credit to a date before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition is to unnecessarily extend the trustee's powers. It
is clear that secured creditors not only in the Second Circuit but in all
other circuits citing the Constance case as authority for their decisions
must realize that the trustee's rights and remedies have been measurably
increased by these cases.
The best method to rectify these decisions would be for Congress to
amend section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act so as to provide that the
trustee may not relate back his lien acquired by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings at the date of bankruptcy to any time before the date of bank-
ruptcy.5 7 Any amendment to section 70(c) should destroy the trustee's
right to relate back his lien so as to destroy the lien of a secured party by
55. 152 F. Supp. 901 (D. N.J. 1957).
56. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:32-11 (1959) provides: "Every provision in a con-
ditional sale reserving property in the seller shall be void as to any purchaser from
or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of such provision, purchases the goods
or acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon them, before the contract or a copy
thereof shall be filed as provided in this chapter, unless such contract or copy
is so filed within ten days after the making of the conditional sale." See also In
the Matter of Lukenbill, 156 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1957). The court distinguished
the Consorto and Constance decisions since in this instance the attempted recording
was never completed under the requirement of Pennsylvania law and thus in effect
there was no recording of the security agreement at all. The trustee then could
avoid the agreement under section 70(c). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-109,
9-302, 9-303(1), 9-401(1) (1953).
57. See Summary of Proceedings, National Bankruptcy Conference 1956, Annual
Meeting, at 57, where Professor MacLachlan suggests the following amendment to
section 70(c) : "The trustee in bankruptcy shall have as of the date of bankruptcy
(and without the benefit of any fiction of relation back prior to bankruptcy) the rights
and powers of : . .. .
[VOL. 5
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a belated recording of the agreement. It should also preserve the distinc-
tion between sections 70(c) and 70(e) so that the trustee's remedy in
the situation of a belated filing is limited to his subrogated rights derived
from an existing creditor who has extended credit in the period between
the date of execution and the date of the recording of the mortgage.
However, there is an instance reported where state law on the filing
requirements of a chattel mortgage in insolvency proceedings has validated
a lien which otherwise would have been voidable by the trustee under
the Constance case. 58 Michigan chattel mortgage law provided, including
the statute and cases interpreting it,59 that a chattel mortgage to be valid
must be filed immediately but an allowance of fourteen days is permitted to
record the mortgage when the question of the validity of the lien is raised in
insolvency proceedings. Here, the mortgage was not filed immediately
but was recorded within the fourteen-day allowance in insolvency pro-
ceedings. The court assumed but did not decide that under the Constance
decision the mortgage would be void. However, it was held that the
powers granted to a trustee under section 70(c) are determined by state
law and the trustee's powers arise at the date of bankruptcy under section
70(c). Yet, state law in this instance, it was said, did not strip the trustee
of any of his powers and remedies as the trustee never acquired the
powers under the state law.
This, of course, is a questionable decision ° as it may be interpreted as
an attermpt by a state to deny the use of its statute to a trustee in a federal
bankruptcy proceeding, thus in conflict with the supremacy clause of the
Constitution.6' Thus, it is advisable that any action taken to rectify the
Constance decision should be by Congress alone.
John F. McElvenny
58. In Re Matter of Hyman Freeman, 168 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
59. MICH. STAr. ANN. § 26.929 (1956). "Every mortgage of conveyance in-
tended to operate as a mortgage of goods and chattels which shall hereafter be
made which shall not be accompanied by an immediate delivery and followed by an
actual and continued change of possession of the things mortgaged, shall be absolutely
void as against creditors of the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers or
mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage or a true copy thereof shall be
filed . . . : Provided, however, that any such mortgage shall not be void in the
case of insolvency proceedings as against the creditors of the mortgagor if filed within
14 days from the date thereof .... Also see Ransom & Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272
Mich. 31, 261 N.W. 128 (1935), to the effect that a chattel mortgage must be
recorded immediately; otherwise it is ineffective against general creditors who
extend credit between its execution and the recording.
60. MacLachlan, Two Wrongs Make a Right, 37 TZxAs L. Rpv. 676 (1959).
61. U. S. CONST. Art. VI, § 9.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW-WORLD COURT-NEED FOR RE-EVALUATION
OF THE CONNALLY RESERVATION.
Within the past thirteen years, thirty-eight member-States of the
United Nations have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the World
Court under article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.'
However, most of these acceptances of compulsory jurisdiction are subject
to a condition of reciprocity and exclude specific kinds of disputes. In
accepting compulsory jurisdiction, the United States qualified its ac-
ceptance by appending thereto the Connally Reservation which, in effect,
makes such acceptance limited to those matters which do not fall within
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States, the United States reserving
the right to interpret the phrase "domestic jurisdiction." The purpose
of this Comment is to discuss the motivating force behind the acceptance
of compulsory jurisdiction, the qualification thereof by the Connally Reser-
vation and its resulting effects. The scope of jurisdiction of the World
Court over international conflicts will be discussed. Arguments, both
legal and political, will be analyzed, dealing with both the retention and
the removal of the Connally Reservation. Before the Connally Reservation
is discussed, however, a summary of the historical developments leading
up to the establishment of the present World Court 2 will be helpful to a
better understanding of the existing problem.
I.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ARBITRATION AND A WORLD COURT.
Although Grotius is conceded to be the father of modern international
law,3 the first attempt to formulate an international arbitral court is
generally attributed to the Greek, Amphictyonies, who established a com-
mission to deal with problems arising among the Grecian States.4 Later,
the Romans encouraged and practiced arbitration, even applying foreign
law to those conflicts involving a non-Roman citizen. 5 When the Roman
Empire was destroyed in the fifth century, the Church assumed the role
as arbiter of any conflict arising between nations.6 Throughout the Middle
1. See note 21 infra.
2. The term "World Court" is used henceforth to include the Permanent Court
of International Justice, which functioned from 1922 to 1940, or the International
Court of Justice which has been in existence since 1946.
3. See Fenwick, The Sources of International Law, 16 MICH. L. REv. 393, 396
(1918) ; Pollack, The Sources of International Law, 2 CoLuM. L. REv. 511, 517-19
(1902).
4. Dg BUSTAMANTE, TH9 WORLD COURT 1 (3d ed. 1926). For a different
opinion, see Wehle, Comparative Law's Proper Task For the International Court,
99 U. PA. L. Rev. 13, 15 (1950).
5. See De BUSTAMANTE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2.
6. See Brown, International Courts, 20 YALt L. J. 1, 2 (1910).
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Ages, the Church was the primary force behind the continued growth
of international law and arbitration in Western Europe.7 The Reforma-
tion, however, destroyed religious unity and also reduced the great powers
of Western Europe to States of equality by the Treaty of Westphalia.8
By recognizing the independent sovereignty of the States of Western
Europe and their exclusive jurisdiction over their own territory, the
Congress of Westphalia marked the true beginning of modern international
law,9 and a step toward the existence of a World Court.
In 1899, the Hague Conference'0 developed from an ad hoc system of
arbitration which had served to decide disputes arising out of treaties,
boundaries or other international conflicts." Though the Conference suc-
ceeded only in evoking an opinion concerning the question of restrictions
on military charges and armament limitation agreements,'12 it did result
in the formation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 3 this being
the earliest significant attempt to standardize the procedure of arbitration.
14
The Hague Conference of 1907 initiated the International Prize Court
which imposed compulsory arbitration in a limited class of cases upon its
members. 15 However, the convention proposing a World Court failed be-
cause some of the members were not prepared to accept compulsory juris-
diction in international conflicts.' 6
In 1920, the League of Nations established the Permanent Court of
International Justice.'7 Forty-two nations accepted the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court, the fact that acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
was optional having been instrumental in its successful establishment.' 8
The Court sat from 1922 to 1940, handling sixty-five cases, rendering
7. Wehle, Comparative Law's Proper Task for the International Court, 99
U. PA. L. REv. 13, 16 (1950). Until the fifteenth century, the Church promoted
and sanctificed treaties and acted as arbiters in disputes.
8. See DE BUSTAMANTE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 5.
9. Foster, The Evolution of International Law, 18 YALE L. J. 149, 153 (1908).
Grotius, the great Dutch publicist, had advocated a congress of States where
disinterested parties would decide international disputes and have authority to compel
the parties to accept the peace imposed. This specific proposal did not materialize,
but twenty-three years later the Congress of Westphalia emerged.
10. The Conference was comprised of twenty European nations, four Asiatic
nations and two American nations.
11. See Foster, supra note 9, at 151.
12. Brown, supra note 6, at 6. That little attention was paid to the restrictive
opinions of the Conference was evidenced shortly thereafter by Russia's action in
going to war with Japan. Ironically enough, it had been Russia who had initially
proffered the theory of the Conference.
13. A considerable number of arbitrations have been conducted by tribunals
formed under the Permanent Court of Arbitration. See SCOTT, HAcUe COURT RE-
PORTS (1916); WILSON, THE HAGUE ARBITRATION CASES (1915).
14. See SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS OV 1899 AND 1907 41 (2d ed. 1915).
The United States was among the fifty-two ratifying States. Its ratification instru-
ment contained a reservation excluding "purely American questions."
15. See Brown, supra note 6, at 7-8.
16. See DE BUSTAMANTE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 47, 66.
17. With respect to this Court, as well as the process of peaceful settlement of
international disputes, a standard work is HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT Oil
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942 (1943).
18. Id. at 779.
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thirty-two decisions in contentious cases and twenty-seven advisory
opinions. 19
In 1948, the International Court of Justice replaced the Permanent
Court of International Justice.20 Only thirty-eight nations have accepted
compulsory jurisdiction by this Court.21
II.
JURISDICTION OF THE WORLD COURT.
A.
The Subject Matter in Dispute.
The competency of the International Court of Justice extends to all
cases referred to it and to all cases over which it is specifically given
jurisdiction in the United Nations Charter, in treaties, or in conventions
in force. 22 Additional compulsory jurisdiction may be conferred at the
option of States which are parties to the statute of the International Court,
23
including all members of the United Nations. 24 The acceptance of such
compulsory jurisdiction may be conditioned upon reciprocity, or may be
confined to a specified period of time.25 When this option has been exer-
cised by declaration the Court's jurisdiction is extended to any dispute
arising over :26
"a. the interpretation of a treaty;
19. See Hudson, The Twenty-Fifth Year of the World Court, 40 AM. J. INT'L. L.
1 (1947).
20. See Schwarzenberger, Trends in the Practice of The World Court, 4
CURRIENT LEGAL PROBLZMS 1 (1951).
21. The States which currently have effective declarations of adherence filed
with the Secretariat of the United Nations are: Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada,
China, Columbia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvadore, Finland, France,
Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Japan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Philippines, Portugal, The Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Union
of South Africa, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States of America
and Uraguay.
22. STAT. INT'L, CT. JusT. art. 36, para. 3. "The jurisdiction of the court com-
prises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specifically provided
for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and convensions in force."
23. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 36, para. 2.
24. U. N. CHARTER art. 93, para. 1. "All members of the United Nations are
ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice."
25. See STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 36, para. 3.
26. Article 36, para. 2 provides: "The states parties to the present statute may
at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdic-
tion of the Court in all legal disputes concerning . .. ."
Many States were disposed to drop the option left to the Statutes by article 36
of the 1920 statute (Permanent Court of International Justice) when revision was
undertaken in 1945 to prepare the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and
to make recognition of compulsory jurisdiction obligatory for every party to the
revised statute. This proposal did not prevail at San Francisco largely because
of the opposition of the United States and the Soviet Union, neither of which had
become a party to the 1920 statute. Hudson, The World Court, 32 A.B.A.J. 832-33
(1946).
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b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute
a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation."
Except where jurisdiction is thus conferred, no means are available by
which a would-be plaintiff State may bring another State before the
Court without the latter's consent.27
There is another restraint on the Court's jurisdiction which is of
paramount importance in any discussion concerning the Connally Reserva-
tion. Jurisdiction is limited to disputes concerning matters which are not
essentially domestic in character. The Court, being an organ of the
United Nations, 28 is bound by its Charter provisions prohibiting inter-
vention in such matters.2 Left open by the Charter and the statute,
however, is the definition of what is within the domestic jurisdiction of a
state and conversely without the jurisdiction of the Court. This problem
will be considered in some detail subsequently.
B.
The Parties to the Dispute.
Having thus set out the Court's limited jurisdiction over subject
matter, it is now necessary to consider the competency of parties to sue
or be sued therein. Only States may be parties before the Court.30
The rigidity of this rule is somewhat mitigated insofar as the United
Nations itself is concerned. Not being a State, it cannot appear before
the Court. It may, however, request the Court to give an advisory opinion
on any legal issue.8 1 This includes a legal question involving a dispute
to which the United Nations is a party. 2 It is symptomatic of the in-
adequacy of article 36 of the statute that although the Court has held
that the United Nations is a subject of international law and can put
forward an international claim, 8 it is precluded from bringing that claim
before its own principal judicial organ.84
Individuals have no capacity to sue or be sued before the Court
under article 36, paragraph 1. However, claims of an individual can
27. See, BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 58 (1953).
28. U. N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 1; STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 1.
29. U. N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7; Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with
Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, 70: "The Court as an
organ of the United Nations is bound to observe the provisions of the Charter
including Article 2, paragraph 7."
30. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 34, para. 1.
31. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 65, para. 1.
32. 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-55 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1948).
33. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations, [1949]
I.C.J. Rep. 174.
34. 2 OPPENIIEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1948).
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sometimes be indirectly considered through a claim by the State of which
the individual is a subject. Of course, in such a proceeding the claim
is actually made by the State on the basis of an injury to the subject
being an injury to the sovereign.3 5
An additional limitation is found in the provisions that only par-
ticular States - those parties to the statute - may sue or be sued
in the Court.36 All members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to
the statute and are competent to appear.3 7 The Charter also provides that
any State not a member may become a party to the statute on conditions
to be determined by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the
Security Council.3  These conditions shall in no case place the parties
in a position of inequality before the Court.3 9
III.
THE MORSE RESOLUTION AND THE CONNALLY RESERVATION.
On August 2, 1946, the Morse Resolution was passed by a sixty-to-two
vote in the United States Senate. 40 In accordance with the "advice and
consent" treaty-making provisions of the federal constitution,41 the Morse
Resolution authorized the President of the United States to deposit with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations a Declaration of Adherence
to the optional compulsory jurisdiction clause of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court.
42
Until this time the United States had been deterred from participating
actively in any type of World Court by a long-standing tradition of the
United States Senate that no obligation to arbitrate or adjudicate inter-
national disputes be undertaken unless a special agreement, consented by
a two-thirds vote of the Senate, had been entered into with an individual
State.43 The proponents of the Morse Resolution, however, believed that
this tradition could no longer be adhered to.44 It was felt that isolationism
was dead,45 and rejection of compulsory jurisdiction would defeat the
very purpose of the San Francisco Conference. 46 In addition, since other
member-States of the Court which had declared their adherence to the
35. Mavromatis Palestine Concessions, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 6 (1924).
36. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 34, para. 1.
37. See note 24 supra.
38. U. N. CHARTFR art. 93, para. 2.
39. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 35, para. 2.
40. S. Res. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); see Morse, Significance of the
Senate Action for International Justice Thru Law, 32 A.B.A.J. 776 (1946).
41. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
42. The Declaration is found at 61 Stat. 1218, 1 U.N.T.S. 9 (1946).
43. See 91 CONG. Rtc. 8247 (1945) (remarks of Senator Vandenberg).
44. See Morse, su pra note 40, at 777.
45. Ibid.
46. See Morse, supra note 40, at 778. "The time has come to find out whether
or not the United States government, insofar as the Senate of the United States is
concerned, is ready to live up to the moral obligations so clearly crystallized in the
Resolution passed at the San Francisco Conference."
[VOL. 5
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"optional clause" were not subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court in any action brought by another member-State which had not
declared its adherence to such clause, failure by the United States to accept
compulsory jurisdiction would seriously limit its powers as a plaintiff
in the Court.4 7
Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations provides: "Nothing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any State. .".. -41 Article 36(6) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice provides: "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court
has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court. '4 9
Consistent with Article 2(7), the Morse Resolution provides that the
Declaration of Adherence by the United States should not apply to "dis-
putes with regard to matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of the United States. '50  The Connally Reservation, however, incon-
sistent with article 36(6), appended to the Morse Resolution the reserva-
tion "as determined by the United States of America."'
In effect, the Connally Reservation reserves to the United States
the right to determine whether any dispute to which it is a party involves
a matter within its domestic jurisdiction. The reservation thereby strips
the Court of its ancillary jurisdiction52 to determine whether or not it is
competent to hear the case. This constitutes a veto power, reserved by
the United States, which it may use in any case, whether or not it
realistically concludes that the problem is within its domestic jurisdiction."
Exclusive of a special agreement or treaty with another nation, the Con-
nally Reservation emasculates the Morse Resolution since the United
States need not accept compulsory jurisdiction even though it has de-
clared its adherence thereto. It may, at its discretion, accept jurisdiction
on an ad hoc basis.5 4 The only advance which appears to have been made
over the practice of the United States as it existed prior to the Morse
Resolution as amended by the Connally Reservation is that any determi-
47. See 92 CONG. REc. 10557, 10630 (1946) ; STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 36, para. 3.
48. U. N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
49. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 36, para. 6.
50. See S. Res. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); 5 DEP'T STATE BULL. 452
(1946).
51. Ibid. The Morse Resolution, as amended by the Connally Reservation, reads
as follows in § b:
"Provided, That such declaration should not apply to-
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domesticjurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United
States of America."
52. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 36, para. 6.
53. See Preuss, The International Court of Justice, 32 A.B.A.J. 660-61 (1946)
Wagner, Is a Compulsory Adjudication of International Legal Disputes Possible?, 47
Nw. U. L. REv. 21, 36 (1952).
54. See Becker, Some Political Problems of the Legal Adviser, Proceedings, AM.
Soc. oF INT. LAw 266-67 (1958) citing United Nations, Introduction to Annual Report
for 1956-57 by Sec't Gen.
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nation of what is or is not a matter of domestic jurisdiction is to be
made by the President without the advice and consent of the Senate.55
Prior to the Connally Reservation, no other nation, as a member of
the Permanent Court of International Justice or of the International Court
of Justice, had made its Declaration of Adherence to compulsory juris-
diction expressly conditional upon a self-judging domestic jurisdiction
clause.56 The effect of the reservation on the attitude of other member-
State. of the Court is evidenced by the fact that six other nations ex-
pressly included a similar reservation in their Declaration of Adherence
after the passage of the Connally Reservation. 57
IV.
THE CONSTITUTION AND ACCEPTANCE OF COMPULSORY JURISDICTION.
It is a recognized principle of international law that provisions
of a State constitution have no effect on the international obligations
of a treaty.58 This rule has often been accepted by the United States.5 9
However, in discussing the constitutional matters connected with the
Connally Reservation this principle must be disregarded and purely
municipal (i.e., internal) law considered. If the rule of international law
were applied any consideration of constitutional problems would of
necessity be precluded.
Initially, a determination must be made as to the constitutionality of
the Senate's insertion of the reservation. Treaties, of which the United
States' declaration under article 36, paragraph 2 of the statute is one,60
55. See Morse, supra note 40, at 776.
56. Hudson, The World Court, 32 A.B.A.J. 832 (1946).
57. Those states are Mexico, France, Liberia, Union of South Africa, Pakistan
and the Sudan. France has since withdrawn its reservation.
58. In its opinion on Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, P..C.I.J., ser.
A/B, No. 44, at 24 (1932), the World Court ruled that a State cannot adduce
as against another State its own constitution with a view to evading obligations
incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force. See also Free Zones
Case, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 24, at 12 (1930); Declaration of Rights and Duties of
States, U.N. General Assembly, OPPICIAL RxcoRDs, Fourth Session, Supp. No. 10
(A-925), pp. 8-9.
59. Hackforth, Hearings on S. 1385. Before the Subcommittee of Committee
on Commerce, 79th Cong. (1944) at 230: ". . . in international law the head of the
government is entitled to speak for the State, and if the President enters into an
obligation with a foreign government, that foreign government is entitled to rely
upon it. It is not under the obligation of inquiring into our constitutional processes."
See also statement by Secretary of State Bayard in 1887 U. S. FoREIGN RZL. 751,
753. However, in the Interhandel Case [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 105, the United States
did contend that the Constitution can be so used. See 36 D9p"T STATE BULL. 350,
357 (1957) for American note to the Swiss Government to this effect.
60. A treaty has been defined as a "formal instrument of agreement by which
two or more States establish or seek to establish a relation under international
law between themselves, the internati.ona? juridicial effect of [which] is not de-
pendent upon the name given to the instrument." Harvard Research, Draft
Covenant on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 686, 710 (Supp. 1935). The
Statute of the International Court of Justice clearly falls within this definition.
This treatment has been given to the United Nations Charter - of which the
statute is an integral part - in Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349
U.S. 70 (1955).
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are made by the President" with the advice and consent of the Senate.62
The Senate may withhold its consent or give a qualified consent.683 The
Senate did the latter when it appended the Connally Reservation to the
Declaration of Adherence. Obviously this was within the powers of that
body. '4 Having thus disposed of the preliminary question it must now be
determined whether or not the declaration without the reservation is
constitutional. The two basic areas of purported constitutional conflict
and the arguments thereunder are discussed below.
A.
The World Court and Article III of the Constitution.
The argument has been advanced that compulsory jurisdiction results
in an unconstitutional grant by the President and the Senate of the
judicial power of the United States in derogation of the Constitution.6 5
Article III gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over disputes involving
the interpretation of treaties and disputes to which the United States is
a party.66 The argument is made that the Constitution is violated by giving
the World Court jurisdiction over much the same type of controversy.
Since the World Court has been given its jurisdiction over the United
States by treaty, the question is basically one of the extent of the treaty
power. Could this jurisdiction be given by treaty?
The treaty power extends to all matters appropriate to our external
relations.6 7 A distinction must therefore be made between the external
powers and the internal powers of the government. 6 As to the former
the nation has the power to make any agreement whatever.6 9 Bearing
this principle in mind it is clear that membership in the World Court
is a valid exercise of the treaty power and creates no difficulties to the
extent that its jurisdiction is limited to external matters.70 The grants
of jurisdiction in article III of the Constitution were intended to affect
state-federal relations only.71 Further support is lent to this proposition by
the principle frequently expressed that the Constitution has no extra-terri-
torial effect. 72 Since the World Court can adjudicate only disputes as
61. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211 (1872).
62. Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32 (1869).
63. Ibid.
64. Clark v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635 (1853).
65. Ely, Treaty-Making Power: The Constitutionality of the International Court
of Justice, 36 A.B.A.J. 738 (1950).
66. U. S. CONST. art. 3.
67. Santovencenzo v. Egan" 284 U.S. 258 (1931); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S.
332 (1923); Holden v. Joy 84 U.S. 211 (1872).
68. United States v. Curtis-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
69. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1919) ; Holden v. Joy 84 U.S. 211
(1872). See Hughes, Proceedings, AM. Soc. oF INr. LAW 194-96 (1929).
70. See Ely, supra note 65, at 800.
71. The Koenigen Luise, 184 Fed. 170 (1910).
72. In re Ross, 279 U.S. 852 (1928); Neeley v. Kenkel, 180 U.S. 126 (1900).
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to external matters, it cannot be said to conflict with the Constitution which
has only internal effect. There is no common ground on which such a
conflict could arise.
B.
Effect Upon the Bill of Rights and Other Constitutional Provisions
and Restraints.
Opponents predict that the compulsory jurisdiction of the World
Court will result in the eventual deprivation of the individual guarantees
of the Bill of Rights. 73 It is feared that an inferior international Bill
of Rights will be substituted for articles I to VIII.74 The basis of this
argument seems to stem from the theory that the Declaration of Human
Rights75 or the Genocide Convention 76 will become international law,
that the World Court will be called upon to apply them, and will do so
to the detriment of the United States. 77 This would allow amendment of
the Constitution in a manner other than that prescribed in article V.78
The theory supporting these contentions is that since the statute of the
Court - the adherence to which the Connally Reservation is attached -
is a treaty, 79 a decree issued pursuant thereto would be the supreme
law of the land by virtue of article VI. 0 This would be true but only
to a limited extent as seen below.
If the decree of the World Court purported to do what the Constitu-
tion forbids, the Supreme Court would declare it voids ' even though it
would still be effective internationally. 82 This would follow because the
treaty power of the United States is subject to limitation.83 While it is
73. Holman, Treaty Law-Making: A Blank Check for Writing a New Consti-
tution, 36 A.B.A.J. 707 (1950).
74. Ibid.
75. U. N. CHARTER arts. 55 (c), and 56.
76. Ibid.
77. It must be borne in mind that the Declaration of Human Rights is not
intended to be a treaty, but rather a goal for which all nations should strive - it
is not intended to create international law. 19 DXP'T STATE BULL. 751 (1948).
78. Satterfield, Constitutional Amendment by Treaty, 24 Miss. L. J. 280 (1954).
79. See note 60 supra.
80. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Santovencenzo v. Egan, 284
U.S. 258 (1931); United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1925); Asakura v.
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1923) ; Nielson v. Johnson, 229 U.S. 47 (1912); Clark v.
Braden, 57 U.S. 635, (1853).
81. No treaty has ever been declared void. However, in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S,
1 (1956), the Court refused to enforce an executive agreement. In addition,
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1923) held that a treaty stands on the same
footing as the federal constitution and operates without aid of any legislation when
self-executing. Such treaties are equivalent to an act of Congress. Valentine v. United
States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936) ; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) ; Kennett
v. Chambers, 14 U.S. 38 (1887). The Court, of course, can hold an act of Congress
invalid. With these principles in mind, it would appear that the language in The
Koenigen Luise, 184 Fed. 170, 173 (1910), is a correct statement of the law. There
the court said ". . . it is the duty of the court to annul the provisions of a treaty
that are clearly violative of the organic law .. .
82. See note 58 supra.
83. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
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true that for many years the Supreme Court has adopted the view that the
federal government has the authority to make any agreement whatever that
relates to the conduct of international affairs, 8 4 it must also be borne in
mind that the government's power as to external matters is distinguishable
from its power as to the internal matters.85 It is only as to the former that
its powers are unlimited.
The executive branch, as early as 1854, has stated that the Constitution
is to prevail over a treaty where the provisions of the one come in
conflict with the other.8 6 This is in accordance with the expressions of
some authorities on the Constitution.8 7 The theory that a power given
by the Constitution cannot be so construed as to authorize destruction
of other provisions of the same instrument certainly has the strength
of the legal logic supporting it.8s The Supreme Court has adopted this
view in The Cherokee Tobacco:8 9 "It need hardly be said that a treaty
cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that
instrument." A search of the cases reveals that at no time has the Supreme
Court rejected this doctrine.90 Reid v. Covert,91 a 1956 case, appears to
follow this rule and reaffirms the principle that treaties are subject to
constitutional limitations. This case is of particular significance since it
was decided after the United States became a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. The Supreme Court said:
"It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those
who created the Constitution, as well as those who created the
Bill of Rights - let alone alien to our entire constitutional history
and tradition - to construe article 6 as permitting the United States
to exercise power under an international agreement without observing
constitutional procedures. In effect such construction would permit
amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned by article
5. The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to
all branches of the national government and they cannot be nullified
by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined."
Since a decree of the World Court would have no greater effect than that
from which it springs - the treaty by which the United States became
subject to the Court's jurisdiction - it follows that the decree also must
84. Santovencenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 258 (1931) ; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1919); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1889); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211
(1872).
85. United States v. Curtis-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
86. Secretary of State March, as reported in 5 Moon , DIGEsT oF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 167 (1906).
87. See, e.g., CooLEv, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103 (2d Ed. 1891) ; Hughes, Pro-
ceedings, Am. Soc. oF INT. LAW 194-96 (1929).
88. 2 STOREY, CONSTITUTION 315 (1851).
89. 78 U.S. 616, 620-21 (1870). See also Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1923)
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
90. McLaughlin, Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 MINN.
L. Rev. 709 (1958).
91. 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1956).
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comply with the limitations on the treaty power of the United States.
Such a decree would not be given supremacy under article VI if it vio-
lated any of the provisions of the Constitution. From the above argu-
ments, it would appear that granting the World Court the unrestricted
compulsory jurisdiction provided for in the original Morse Resolution,
would in no way jeopardize the restraints and guarantees of the Constitu-
tion.
V.
LEGAL AND POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
CONNALLY RESERVATION.
The Connally Reservation has been severely criticized since its in-
ception.92 The issues contested have been many.9s When the reservation
was passed in 1946, the question of its legal validity arose. The contention
was, since the reservation offended the principles of the statute which
gave the Court of International Justice power to decide disputes con-
cerning its own jurisdiction, including questions as to the meaning or
effect of the reservation, it might invalidate the Declaration of Adherence
by the United States.94 The consistency of the amendment with the text
of the statute was discussed in the Senate. There it was felt, in view
of past practice, that there could be little doubt that under article 36(2) of
the statute,9 5 a State could take exception to the jurisdiction which it
recognized.9 6 Unfortunately, this question has not yet been decided by
the Court.97
Another contention has been that an international agreement con-
ditioned by such opportunities for evasion was possibly an obligation with-
out vinculum juris. An obligation whose scope is left to the evaluation of the
obligee, so that his will constitutes a legally recognized condition of the
92. See, e.g., Briggs, The United States and the International Court of Justice; A
Re-examination, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 301 (1959); Preuss, The International Court of
Justice, the Senate, and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 720
(1946).
93. See, e.g., Brownell, Law in the Settlement of Disputes Between Nations, 31
CONN. BAR J. 346, 355 (1957); Speech of Vice-President Nixon to the Academy
of Political Science, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1959, p. 20, cols. 1-8.
94. See Preuss, The International Court of Justice, 32 A.B.A.J. 660, 662 (1946);
Waldock, The Plea of Domestic Jurisdiction Before International Legal Tribunals, 31
BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 96, 142 (1954).
95. See note 26 supra.
96. This was expressly declared by the Fifth Assembly of the League of
Nations in 1924, and by the Ninth Assembly in 1928, and while the amendment
was not in the spirit of article 36(6) of the statute, it would seem difficult to main-
tain that it constituted a violation of that provision. See Hudson, The World Court,
32 A.B.A.J. 832, 835-36 (1945); Lawson, The Problem of Compulsory Jurisdiction
of the World Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 219, 237 (1952).
97. See Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9, 46; Interhandel
Case, [19571 I.C.J. Rep. 105. The problem was discussed extensively in both cases
by some of the judges. Judges Lauterpacht and Spender took the view that the
entire Declaration of Adherence was invalid since the reservation clause was invalid
as being incompatible with article 36(6) of the statute and that it could not be
severed from the rest of the declaration.
[VOL. 5
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existence of the duty, does not constitute a legal bond.98 It does not
appear that the Court has dealt with this issue.
Although the phrase "within the domestic jurisdiction" was often
used before 1945 in arbitration treaties and in the Covenant of the League
of Nations,99 its difficulty of definition as employed in the Morse Resolu-
tion100 coupled with the elusive meaning of "essentially"'0 1 provides
the opponents of the Morse Resolution with an argument for the retention
of the Connally Reservation.102 There is a recognized difference among
States in interpretation of what is "essentially domestic."' 03 Thus, it is
argued, the interpretation of the term by the World Court could differ
from that of the United States, depending on whether or not the inter-
pretation of the term by the United States coincided with the view of
existing international law.1 0 ' Even though a matter may closely concern
the interests of more than one State, it is not of necessity within the realm
of international affairs and hence subject to the Court's jurisdiction.10 5
For example, international law does not purport to regulate the laws of
the States as to nationality'0 6 and immigration policies.' 0 T But these
are fine lines and fear of such regulation was one of the principal reasons
for the adoption of the Connally Reservation.10 8  Even assuming that
98. Preuss, The International Court of Justice, 32 A.B A.J. 660, 662, (1946).
99. See League of Nations Covenant art. 15, No. 8.
100. See A.B.A. Sect. of Int'l and Comp. L., August (1959). A most competent
and comprehensive report of the self-judging aspect of the United States domestic
jurisdiction reservation with respect to the International Court of Justice was pre-
pared by a special committee of the American Bar Association.
101. See note 51 supra.
102. See note 100 supra at 54.
103. Ibid.
104. This is so because international law is based upon the common consent
of a "majority" of nations extending over a period of time sufficient in duration
to cause it to become crystallized into a rule of conduct. See 1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST
OP INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1940). The point is that even though a nation might
disagree with the majority of nations, the majority view is imposed upon that
nation as being the international law.
105. BRIrRLY, THE LAW op NATIONs, 63, 74-6 (4th ed. 1949).
106. 3 HACKWORTH, DIcST oF INTERNATXONAL LAW, 1-3 (1942). "Nationality
is a subject of municipal as distinguished from international law."
107. See 1 OPPSNHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 288-92 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1948).
108. "The United States is the object of envy of many nations
of the world and many people. Our Treasury is most attractive to them.
Immigration to our shores is something dreamed of. I do not favor and I shall
not vote to make it possible for the International Court of Justice to decide
whether a question of immigration to our shores is a domestic question or an
international question. It is a domestic question, of course; but the Court might
contend it is international in character. The Court might say, 'A man leaves
one country and migrates to another, and therefore an international question
is involved, and suit may be brought against the United States because it
discriminates against the citizens of a certain country by not giving them a
sufficiently large quota.'
"Mr. President, do we wish to submit to the International Court the
question whether we have a right to levy tariffs and duties and to regulate
matters of that kind? They are purely domestic questions, and I do not
propose to have the International Court have jurisdiction over them.
"Do we want the International Court of Justice to render judgment in a
case involving the navigation of the Panama Canal? The Court might say,
'It is an international stream, like the Dardanelles, and the commerce of the
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the Court and the United States were presently in accord as to the sig-
nificance of the term, there is still fear of withdrawing the reservation since
the meaning of the term is dependent upon the development of international
law and it is impossible to foresee what "essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction" might be held to include in the future.10 9 The United States,
however, has a veto power granted by articles 84 and 27(3) of the
United Nations Charter, by which it can resist ultimate enforcement by
the Security Council of any decision of the Court." 0 Considering also the
fact that under the Morse Resolution the United States reserves the right
to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Court upon six months notice,'
the United States would appear to have sufficient protection in any matter
which it deems "essentially domestic" without the aid of the Connally
Reservation." 2
The fact that there are fifteen judges sitting on the bench of the
World Court, fourteen of whom reflect judicial philosophies or systems
of law of other States, tends to create a basic fear that domestic matters
might be trespassed upon by a predominantly alien court. There is, how-
ever, nothing in the record of the World Court which indicates a tendency
to encroach upon domestic law." 3
The value of the protection afforded by the Connally Reservation is
significantly counter-balanced by the reciprocity limitation placed upon the
jurisdiction of the Court. Any State which has accepted compulsory juris-
diction may still accept such jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis when it is
a defendant in a suit brought by another State which has conditioned its
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by a reservation. 1 4  Since the
United States is deeply involved in foreign investments and military bases,
no doubt in excess of all other States, it would appear that the United
States, by employing the Connally Reservation, is seriously limiting its
control and protection over such interests." 5
The reaction abroad, to date, has been that five nations have in-
corporated Connally-like reservations into their Declarations of Ad-
world passes through it, and problems relative to it are international problems.'
Such problems are not international. In the case of the Panama Canal, our
treasure bought it, our blood built it, and it is ours by right of construction.
We do (sic) propose to submit to the jurisdiction of any tribunal at any time
the right to say whether a question relative to it is a domestic question."
92 CONe. Rxc. 10695 (1946) (remarks of Senator Connally).
109. See note 104 supra.
110. See U. N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3, § 5. The Security Council requires
an affirmative vote of seven before making its decision. Six of the seven must be
permanent members of the Charter. Since the United States is a permanent member,
no decision can pass without its approval.
111. See Morse, supra note 40, at 779.
112. See note 100 supra at 61.
113. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT Or INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1920-1942)
476-78 (1943).
114. See Becker, Some Political Problems of the Legal Adviser, Proceedings,
AM. Soc. OF INT. LAW 266-67 (1958).
115. See note 100 supra at 55.
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herence.1n At home, the United States has utilized the reservation in
several treaties.117 It is therefore not contrary to logic to foresee the
possibility that more States will avail themselves of the prerogative of
employing similar reservations. Though such reservations may not nullify
the entire Declaration of Adherence, 18 they serve to cloud not only the
powers of the World Court 19 but even worse, the motives and intent of
the reserving State.120
One more argument must be mentioned. Article 36(2) of the State
of the International Court of Justice confines the jurisdiction of the Court
to "legal" disputes.' 2' This, it is argued, would prevent the Court from
taking jurisdiction of political, economic and sociological disputes. 122 It
would appear sufficient, however, to point out that these terms are no
more susceptible of definition than is "essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction."'1 23
VI.
CONCLUSION.
It is unfortunate that the paramount reason for the failure of both
Hague Conferences and the dubious success of the World Court has not
impressed the Senate of the United States. Primarily, this failure was
occasioned by the refusal of key nations to accept compulsory jurisdiction
by the court proposed in each instance.
Assuming that the prior refusals were justified due to the lack of
collateral safeguards, the reason fails to be persuasive insofar as the Inter-
national Court of Justice is concerned. Under the United Nations Charter
the United States can veto any enforcement action taken by the Security
Council where it feels jurisdiction has been improperly exercised by
the Court. Beyond this, the United States Supreme Court could - and
no doubt would - refuse to enforce any adjudication by the World Court
where it finds that it concerns the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States or infringes upon the Constitution. Article III of the Constitution
confers the power to interpret the internal aspects of a treaty on the
Supreme Court.
Positively speaking, the removal of the Connally Reservation would
eliminate any legal issue concerning the international validity of the original
Morse Resolution. Such removal would also tend to provide the United
116. See note 57 supra.
117. See Economic Cooperation Act, (1948), sec. 115 (b) 10. 62 Stat. 137.
118. See note 97 supra.
119. See cases cited at note 97 supra. The World Court has not yet decided the
validity of the Connally Reservation.
120. See Preuss, op. cit. supra note 98, at 662.
121. See STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 36, para. 2.
122. Briggs, The United States and the International Court of Justice; A Re-
examination, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 301 (1959).
123. See note 100 supra.
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States with greater control over its military bases and other installations
on foreign soil. This increased control would follow from the elimination
of the defense of other States of lack of reciprocity in any determination
of issues sought by the United States before the World Court.
If the hope for the birth of a new "one world" lies in the adoption of
the rule of law among nations, it seems vital that the United States partici-
pate in the World Court without reservation. From this posture, it be-
comes patently impossible to equate the nominal safeguards afforded by
the Connally Reservation with the actual benefits to be derived from its
removal. As the guiding light of the free world, it is imperative that the
United States clearly demonstrate its fidelity to the basic conviction that
a rule of law among nations is necessary to the survival of our society. It
cannot be expected that other nations will find the courage to follow these
convictions before we do.
Jack E. Levin
Gerald A. Tallman
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